In commemorating the assassination of Qasim Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, or Tansiqiyat al-Muqawama, issued a statement on January 4 in which it rejected calls for ‘Resistance’ groups to disarm. The Tansiqiya, established in late 2020, aims to coordinate the strategies and activities of the main paramilitary groups in Iraq supported by Iran following the deaths of Sulaimani and Muhandis. Over the last two years, the Tansiqiya has become much less active as the constituent groups have become more independent and pursued separate political agendas. Despite claims to represent more than a dozen groups, the Tansiqiya is essentially the public voice of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and the group of 5 within it.
The statement was clear in saying the groups would not give up their weapons and rejecting any talks on “resistance weapons” before “full national sovereignty” and the end of all foreign military presence. This was clearly a response to a push by Iraqi leaders to end ‘resistance’ activities and presence. On December 20, the Chair of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, thanked the leaders of 4 paramilitary groups for agreeing to “enforce the rule of law, confining weapons to the state, and transitioning to political action after the national need for military action has ceased.” Observers believed Iran was using the statement to send a message that it, and not Iraqi politicians, would determine if and when ‘resistance’ groups would lay down their weapons.
Very soon after the statement was released, confusion arose over whether it truly reflected the views of the groups it claimed to represent. Given that it listed the names of 3 of the 4 groups Zaidan thanked for agreeing to lay down their weapons, it seemed improbable that they would agree to such a statement. Asaib Ahl al-Haq was the first to respond, denying any connection to the statement (tweet by AAH TV chief above). AAH then released a statement essentially supporting efforts to curb the ‘resistance’ by limiting control of weapons to the state. The other 2 groups also distanced themselves from the statement but in a private manner.
In contrast, KH leader Abu Hussain al-Hamidawi backed the statement by the Tansiqiya and thanked it for its position on the control of weapons by the ‘resistance’ groups. His statement also included a pointed criticism of Zaidan’s efforts to lobby IRI groups, stating that it “is necessary for some military leaders and judges to avoid involvement in political disputes.”
The conflicting stances reflect the latest stage in the developing fracture between paramilitary groups who are keen to normalize and focus more on politics, and those that wish to retain the ‘resistance’ role and the autonomy it provides. In the former camp are Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataib al-Imam Ali (KIA), Kataib Sayed al-Shuhada (KSS), and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (AAA). AAH, KIA, and KSS participated in the recent parliamentary election through their own political wings (AAA as individuals), and their success in winning tens of seats can be seen as justification for their decision to focus on politics. The second camp, of Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), have not entered politics formally, though KH does have a parliamentary presence through its affiliate party/bloc Harakat Huquq.
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