After two and half months of tactical maneuvers, the endgame designed by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is finally coming into view. He intends to retain the premiership with some considerable help from Donald Trump. When the President’s post on Truth Social hit Iraqi media at 11pm on Tuesday, it seemed impossible that Nouri al-Maliki would become Prime Minister again. Instead, the only realistic candidate remaining was the one who masterminded Maliki’s nomination, Sudani himself.
Sudani immediately focused on securing a second term in office after he was elected Prime Minister in October 2022. He undertook a series of populist measures to promote his public image while maintaining good ties with his backers in the Coordination Framework. In addition to making appointments that suited his backers in the CF, Sudani avoided a friction point by not running his Tayar al-Foratain party in the December 2023 provincial elections. However, the CF was suspicious of Sudani’s intentions and regretted not having conditioned his nomination on not running for a second term. These suspicions turned into outright hostility in summer 2024 when the judiciary became aware of widespread wiretapping and eavesdropping campaigns by Sudani’s staff against several Iraqi leaders (which had been inherited from the Kadhimi administration).
After Sudani unveiled the Reconstruction and Development coalition in May 2025 to compete in the November elections, the CF set about undermining and attacking him whenever it could. Sudani’s biggest critic was Nouri al-Maliki, who believed the CF had chosen his former acolyte on the naive assumption that they could control him (Maliki did not want Sudani to be PM in late 2022 but went along with the CF’s unanimity). Sudani ignored Maliki’s attacks and placated the CF where he could, expecting that he would win over 70 seats in the election and make a second term a formality.
When the election results came through on November 13, Sudani was underwhelmed. His coalition won 46 seats, a good showing but not enough to force the CF to accept a second term. Sudani met with his advisors on November 14 to decide on a strategy. The first move was to accept that they could not overcome the CF, as their total seats were higher than his (nearly 3:1). On November 15, members of Sudani’s coalition began giving the media soundbites that Sudani would not abandon the CF. On November 18, Sudani surprised the CF in their first meeting since the election by announcing not only that his coalition would remain in the CF, but also that they should immediately declare themselves the largest bloc in the new parliament (he was the first to sign the declaration). Maliki had prepared to assail Sudani in that meeting for splitting the Shia vote, but Sudani outmaneuvered him.
Over the next 4 weeks, Sudani lobbied the CF for a second term but could not secure their backing. His advisors pointed out that Maliki was the biggest obstacle, so the second move was to win him over. Sudani met Maliki several times between mid-December and early January, first trying to convince him with various offers of positions in the next government and then with the idea that they could be PM and political godfather. Maliki demurred; he liked Sudani’s outreach but was still concerned that a second term for Sudani would give him too much power.
The problem for Maliki and the CF was that no other candidates were proposed realistically. Several names were mentioned, but they either lacked political experience or were not party loyalists, and so no party wanted to back them (and risk losing their share of cabinet posts). Once Haibat al-Halbusi was elected Speaker on December 29, the clock began ticking for the CF. Fractures had begun to appear with the election of the first deputy Speaker, as Maliki’s State of Law voted for Mandalawi rather than Faihan of AAH (other parties also split the CF vote). In the vote for the second deputy Speaker, the CF was split again before eventually backing the KDP candidate Atrushi. These were signs that the CF was unlikely to have a consensus on the PM nominee.
Seeing this, Sudani changed tack and stopped lobbying the CF for their support. Instead, he believed time was on his side and the longer the CF was dealocked, the more likely he would keep his post for a second term. Then came Sudani’s final move on January 10. During the weekly CF meeting, Sudani suddenly proposed that Maliki should become the PM. He made it clear that he believed the Reconstruction and Development coalition should hold the post, as it was the biggest party in the CF, but, having failed to convince the CF to back him, Sudani said he would vote for Maliki, as he could garner more support. The CF leaders were caught by surprise; they now had a realistic candidate before them, but could they risk a Maliki third term?
While the other CF leaders thought it was a novel suggestion, over the coming days, Sudani’s insistence and Maliki’s move to shore up support shocked the CF, leading them to believe that Maliki could well become the PM. His chief detractors, Hakim and Khazali, desperately tried to build opposition to him in the CF, but as Ameri, Mandalawi, Fayyadh, and Hamoudi backed Maliki, it seemed a foregone conclusion. Hakim noted at the next CF meeting that Maliki had been ousted by Sistani and that it would be unlikely that regional countries and the United States would back his nomination. Maliki met Hakim and Khazali to try to win their backing, but could not convince them. Iran had sent messages to the CF stating that the realistic choices were Sudani and Maliki, with Maliki as their preference. Najaf remained silent on the matter, and the Americans did not express any opposition to Maliki.
During this time, Sudani was mostly a bystander. He did not lobby for Maliki any further, and when Hakim and Khazali attempted to convince him to stand against Maliki, his response was that he would need backing from most of the CF and the head of the judiciary, Faiq Zaidan, which was not forthcoming. In essence, Sudani’s task was done. If the CF elected Maliki as PM, then Sudani’s coalition would get 5 cabinet positions and the VP position for himself, with a guarantee from Maliki and his backers that Sudani would be the PM in the next term. If Maliki failed to become the PM nominee, then he would be forced to back Sudani as the only alternative.
On January 24, the CF had to resolve the matter. The constitutional deadline for electing a president was days away, and the CF had to have a nominee for PM ready for the incoming president. Despite the objections from Hakim and Khazali, the other CF leaders backed Maliki’s nomination in the absence of a credible alternative. The statement issued that day noted Maliki’s nomination by a majority of the CF rather than by unanimous decision. The general reaction inside Iraq and abroad was one of incredulity.
But Sudani had no intention of giving up his post so meekly. He and his advisors had expected Maliki’s nomination to fail. There were several obstacles, including the election of the President (would the PUK forgive Maliki if he voted against them), the opposition from Halbusi and his allies, potential indirect veto from Najaf, and, should it get that far, the all-important vote in Parliament when Maliki and his cabinet would be presented to MPs. Sudani was in no rush, even though some of his allies panicked that Maliki’s premiership was a done deal. The ace in the hole Sudani held was a near direct line to the White House. He spoke to Trump’s envoy Mark Savaya regularly, and he knew that Trump could be convinced that Maliki was Iran’s man in Iraq, and express explicit opposition. In fact, Sudani and his team had already worked with Savaya and other American officials to make it clear that a Maliki government, particularly one that included KSS and other IRI groups, would not be welcomed (see Reuters and Financial Times).
So, while it may have surprised the CF, Sudani knew that Trump’s effective veto of Maliki was coming. He was assured of it by Savaya, and so Sudani’s endgame has appeared. If Maliki cannot become PM and no other candidates have been considered, the only reasonable alternative is Sudani. Maliki’s critics will be relieved, and even Iran would accept Sudani as an alternative to Maliki, especially in any semi-negotiated bargain with the United States. Sudani played high-stakes poker, and, so far, it appears he won.
Given this sequence of events, several questions arise. Does Sudani want the breakup of the CF? Will the United States give Sudani their blessing or do they seek a better alternative? Does Maliki withdraw his nomination? Will he back Sudani or try to back another candidate? Will Maliki vote for the KDP candidate in the presidential election? Of course, the CF has its hands full too. Do they force Maliki to withdraw, or do they try to stand up to the United States? Will they give Sudani a second term? The CF was split on the choice for the first deputy Speaker, President, and Prime Minister, so there is no guarantee they will reach unanimity again.
Perhaps it is unwise to dismiss Maliki’s chances too soon. If he and the CF decide that Trump’s interference in Iraqi affairs is unacceptable, then they may decide to push on, as unlikely as that may seem. Sudani is still not guaranteed to get the second term; Maliki may suspect him of being behind this whole episode and go after him, and Zaidan may work with Khazali and Hakim to push through a compromise candidate. But the timing may help Sudani; he is the incumbent, and there is little time to choose a PM, so he is gambling that Maliki and the CF will be forced to give him a second term. That is if he believes the United States is, and will continue, supporting him.
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