Author: Sajad

After two and half months of tactical maneuvers, the endgame designed by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is finally coming into view. He intends to retain the premiership with some considerable help from Donald Trump. When the President’s post on Truth Social hit Iraqi media at 11pm on Tuesday, it seemed impossible that Nouri al-Maliki would become Prime Minister again. Instead, the only realistic candidate remaining was the one who masterminded Maliki’s nomination, Sudani himself.

Sudani immediately focused on securing a second term in office after he was elected Prime Minister in October 2022. He undertook a series of populist measures to promote his public image while maintaining good ties with his backers in the Coordination Framework. In addition to making appointments that suited his backers in the CF, Sudani avoided a friction point by not running his Tayar al-Foratain party in the December 2023 provincial elections. However, the CF was suspicious of Sudani’s intentions and regretted not having conditioned his nomination on not running for a second term. These suspicions turned into outright hostility in summer 2024 when the judiciary became aware of widespread wiretapping and eavesdropping campaigns by Sudani’s staff against several Iraqi leaders (which had been inherited from the Kadhimi administration). 

After Sudani unveiled the Reconstruction and Development coalition in May 2025 to compete in the November elections, the CF set about undermining and attacking him whenever it could. Sudani’s biggest critic was Nouri al-Maliki, who believed the CF had chosen his former acolyte on the naive assumption that they could control him (Maliki did not want Sudani to be PM in late 2022 but went along with the CF’s unanimity). Sudani ignored Maliki’s attacks and placated the CF where he could, expecting that he would win over 70 seats in the election and make a second term a formality.

When the election results came through on November 13, Sudani was underwhelmed. His coalition won 46 seats, a good showing but not enough to force the CF to accept a second term. Sudani met with his advisors on November 14 to decide on a strategy. The first move was to accept that they could not overcome the CF, as their total seats were higher than his (nearly 3:1). On November 15, members of Sudani’s coalition began giving the media soundbites that Sudani would not abandon the CF. On November 18, Sudani surprised the CF in their first meeting since the election by announcing not only that his coalition would remain in the CF, but also that they should immediately declare themselves the largest bloc in the new parliament (he was the first to sign the declaration). Maliki had prepared to assail Sudani in that meeting for splitting the Shia vote, but Sudani outmaneuvered him.

Over the next 4 weeks, Sudani lobbied the CF for a second term but could not secure their backing. His advisors pointed out that Maliki was the biggest obstacle, so the second move was to win him over. Sudani met Maliki several times between mid-December and early January, first trying to convince him with various offers of positions in the next government and then with the idea that they could be PM and political godfather. Maliki demurred; he liked Sudani’s outreach but was still concerned that a second term for Sudani would give him too much power. 

The problem for Maliki and the CF was that no other candidates were proposed realistically. Several names were mentioned, but they either lacked political experience or were not party loyalists, and so no party wanted to back them (and risk losing their share of cabinet posts). Once Haibat al-Halbusi was elected Speaker on December 29, the clock began ticking for the CF. Fractures had begun to appear with the election of the first deputy Speaker, as Maliki’s State of Law voted for Mandalawi rather than Faihan of AAH (other parties also split the CF vote). In the vote for the second deputy Speaker, the CF was split again before eventually backing the KDP candidate Atrushi. These were signs that the CF was unlikely to have a consensus on the PM nominee.

Seeing this, Sudani changed tack and stopped lobbying the CF for their support. Instead, he believed time was on his side and the longer the CF was dealocked, the more likely he would keep his post for a second term. Then came Sudani’s final move on January 10. During the weekly CF meeting, Sudani suddenly proposed that Maliki should become the PM. He made it clear that he believed the Reconstruction and Development coalition should hold the post, as it was the biggest party in the CF, but, having failed to convince the CF to back him, Sudani said he would vote for Maliki, as he could garner more support. The CF leaders were caught by surprise; they now had a realistic candidate before them, but could they risk a Maliki third term?

While the other CF leaders thought it was a novel suggestion, over the coming days, Sudani’s insistence and Maliki’s move to shore up support shocked the CF, leading them to believe that Maliki could well become the PM. His chief detractors, Hakim and Khazali, desperately tried to build opposition to him in the CF, but as Ameri, Mandalawi, Fayyadh, and Hamoudi backed Maliki, it seemed a foregone conclusion. Hakim noted at the next CF meeting that Maliki had been ousted by Sistani and that it would be unlikely that regional countries and the United States would back his nomination. Maliki met Hakim and Khazali to try to win their backing, but could not convince them. Iran had sent messages to the CF stating that the realistic choices were Sudani and Maliki, with Maliki as their preference. Najaf remained silent on the matter, and the Americans did not express any opposition to Maliki. 

During this time, Sudani was mostly a bystander. He did not lobby for Maliki any further, and when Hakim and Khazali attempted to convince him to stand against Maliki, his response was that he would need backing from most of the CF and the head of the judiciary, Faiq Zaidan, which was not forthcoming. In essence, Sudani’s task was done. If the CF elected Maliki as PM, then Sudani’s coalition would get 5 cabinet positions and the VP position for himself, with a guarantee from Maliki and his backers that Sudani would be the PM in the next term. If Maliki failed to become the PM nominee, then he would be forced to back Sudani as the only alternative. 

On January 24, the CF had to resolve the matter. The constitutional deadline for electing a president was days away, and the CF had to have a nominee for PM ready for the incoming president. Despite the objections from Hakim and Khazali, the other CF leaders backed Maliki’s nomination in the absence of a credible alternative. The statement issued that day noted Maliki’s nomination by a majority of the CF rather than by unanimous decision. The general reaction inside Iraq and abroad was one of incredulity. 

But Sudani had no intention of giving up his post so meekly. He and his advisors had expected Maliki’s nomination to fail. There were several obstacles, including the election of the President (would the PUK forgive Maliki if he voted against them), the opposition from Halbusi and his allies, potential indirect veto from Najaf, and, should it get that far, the all-important vote in Parliament when Maliki and his cabinet would be presented to MPs. Sudani was in no rush, even though some of his allies panicked that Maliki’s premiership was a done deal. The ace in the hole Sudani held was a near direct line to the White House. He spoke to Trump’s envoy Mark Savaya regularly, and he knew that Trump could be convinced that Maliki was Iran’s man in Iraq, and express explicit opposition. In fact, Sudani and his team had already worked with Savaya and other American officials to make it clear that a Maliki government, particularly one that included KSS and other IRI groups, would not be welcomed (see Reuters and Financial Times). 

So, while it may have surprised the CF, Sudani knew that Trump’s effective veto of Maliki was coming. He was assured of it by Savaya, and so Sudani’s endgame has appeared. If Maliki cannot become PM and no other candidates have been considered, the only reasonable alternative is Sudani. Maliki’s critics will be relieved, and even Iran would accept Sudani as an alternative to Maliki, especially in any semi-negotiated bargain with the United States. Sudani played high-stakes poker, and, so far, it appears he won.

Given this sequence of events, several questions arise. Does Sudani want the breakup of the CF? Will the United States give Sudani their blessing or do they seek a better alternative? Does Maliki withdraw his nomination? Will he back Sudani or try to back another candidate? Will Maliki vote for the KDP candidate in the presidential election? Of course, the CF has its hands full too. Do they force Maliki to withdraw, or do they try to stand up to the United States? Will they give Sudani a second term? The CF was split on the choice for the first deputy Speaker, President, and Prime Minister, so there is no guarantee they will reach unanimity again. 

Perhaps it is unwise to dismiss Maliki’s chances too soon. If he and the CF decide that Trump’s interference in Iraqi affairs is unacceptable, then they may decide to push on, as unlikely as that may seem. Sudani is still not guaranteed to get the second term; Maliki may suspect him of being behind this whole episode and go after him, and Zaidan may work with Khazali and Hakim to push through a compromise candidate. But the timing may help Sudani; he is the incumbent, and there is little time to choose a PM, so he is gambling that Maliki and the CF will be forced to give him a second term. That is if he believes the United States is, and will continue, supporting him.

After having failed to complete the election of the Speaker and 2 deputies on Monday, the last day per the constitutional timeline, the second deputy Speaker, Farhad Atrushi, was elected on Tuesday evening. With a deadlock persisting after the second round of voting, the temporary Speaker, Amer al-Fayiz, adjourned the session at nearly 1 am on Tuesday, ostensibly for “consultations,” until 2 pm Tuesday. The consultations were meant to bypass a legal ruling that prevents Parliament from maintaining open sessions, thereby forcing it to stick to constitutional deadlines. Apparently, this move was approved by the Chair of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, who was present in the Tuesday afternoon session to ensure proceedings did not face further delays.

The deadlock was brought about after the PUK, Taqadum, and AAH (as well as other smaller parties) voted for Rebwar Karim in both rounds instead of Shakhawan Abdullah. Each party had its own reasons for voting against the KDP: the PUK as a response to the KDP attempting to take over nomination of the President, Taqadum as a response to the KDP vetoing Muhammad Halbusi’s push to become Speaker again, and AAH in response to the KDP not voting for Adnan Faihan as the first deputy Speaker (the KDP voted for Mandalawi). Framework leaders Maliki, Ameri, and Hakim lobbied hard for a compromise on Tuesday morning, and, with Abdullah’s replacement by Atrushi, they convinced the 3 parties that a symbolic victory had been won and that they had to back the KDP candidate for the political process to move forward.

On Tuesday evening, a relatively smooth vote saw Farhad Atrushi receive 178 votes to Rebwar Karim’s 104, thereby completing the three-man presidium of Parliament. But the events of the two days point to continued political friction between the parties and within each constituency. The Sunni National Political struggled to reach a consensus on a Speaker, and the parties are in a furious competition for cabinet positions. The Shia Coordination Framework has still not agreed on a PM nominee and was divided in the voting for the first and second deputy Speakers. The KDP and PUK are divided on the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the nominee for President of the Republic. The divisions look set to intensify in the coming weeks as decision time looms on choosing a President and a Prime Minister.

Upon assuming his duties, Speaker Haibat al-Halbusi confirmed the Coordination Framework as the largest bloc in Parliament. He also declared nominations open for the position of President and then adjourned Parliament until Monday, 5 January. Halbusi later met with leaders of the National Political Council, who welcomed back Muthanna al-Samarrai.

On Wednesday, the Speaker held a series of meetings, including with Prime Minister Sudani, but a couple stood out for the way they were conducted. During meetings with the Jordanian and Iranian Ambassadors, the Speaker was seated to the side of Taqadum’s party chief, Muhammad al-Halbusi. This again reinforced the obvious seniority and the real Speaker of Parliament.

Some coverage in the past two days has also focused on the election of the first deputy Speaker, Adnan Faihan of AAH. A two-term MP and the outgoing Governor of Babylon province, Faihan is a senior figure in AAH, which the United States designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2020. Observers question what the U.S. response will be and if they will have any dealings with Faihan. AAH has a senior member, Naeem al-Aboudi, in the Sudani government as the Higher Education Minister, and the U.S. avoided all contact or cooperation with the Ministry as a result. 

After yesterday’s drama, today’s vote for the new Speaker of Parliament was a far more mundane affair. Despite insisting on the right to run for the position, Muthanna al-Samarrai withdrew his candidacy just before the vote began. He spoke briefly before the candidates were announced, declaring his withdrawal “for the public interest.” Samarrai had pinned his hopes on the Coordination Framework voting for him, but the Framework told him they would vote for Haibat al-Halbusi, as he had the backing of the majority of the Sunni parties.

Haibat al-Halbusi received 208 votes from the 309 MPs in attendance, with Salim al-Issawi a distant second with 66 votes. This marked the return of control of Parliament to Taqadum’s leader, Muhammad al-Halbusi, who had been ousted in his second term in November 2023. During his two-year hiatus, he largely repaired relations with the Framework and the Sunni parties, which provided the platform for his return to political ascendancy.

Muthanna al-Samarrai met earlier today with the Chair of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, to query if there were any legal implications for Haibat al-Halbusi’s election as Speaker. After being informed that both he and Halbusi would face no immediate judicial investigations into forged documents and corruption, Samarrai met with the National Political Council leaders, who issued a statement thanking him for withdrawing his candidacy for Speaker.

The Framework wasted no time in providing a signed declaration of party leaders showing it as the largest bloc to the new Speaker. Framework Secretary-General Abbas Radhi al-Ameri presented the document to Haibat al-Halbusi before voting began for the first deputy Speaker. The Framework has yet to agree on a candidate for Prime Minister, and there was also no consensus on the nominee for the first deputy Speaker.

During Halbusi’s second term as Speaker, the Framework viewed Muhsin al-Mandalawi, the first deputy Speaker, as largely ineffective. Lacking political experience and confidence, Mandalawi was a shadow of the influence his predecessor, the Sadrist Hakim al-Zamili, wielded during his short-lived tenure. The Framework was keen to replace Mandalawi with a deputy Speaker who would have such an impact.

Yasir Abd Sukhayl al-Maliki of State of Law and Adnan Faihan al-Dulaimi, the outgoing governor of Babylon province from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, were the frontrunners, but Mandalawi insisted he would run as well. Eventually, State of Law backed AAH candidate Faihan, and in today’s vote, Faihan received 178 votes to Mandalawi’s 107. The division within the Framework may not have been consequential at this juncture, but it hints at how protracted the consensus for the PM nominee has become.

The vote for the second deputy Speaker, which was supposed to be the most straightforward one of the day, ended up being far closer and much more protracted than expected. MPs voted according to their individual preferences rather than following bloc instructions, a trend that has become more common in recent years. Disputes over the spelling of some of the names in the ballot slips intensified as the vote looked like it was heading to an upset. The incumbent, Shakhawan Abdullah of the KDP, who was expected to retain his position easily, received only 119 votes out of 293. In a surprise result, Rebwar Karim of al-Mawqif al-Watani (Halwest) received 153 votes, just short of the 165 needed for an outright win and to avoid a second round of voting.

During a nearly 4-hour delay before the second round, the KDP lobbied various party leaders for their support, threatening to withdraw from Parliament and from government formation. Most of the Framework also attempted to marshal its MPs to vote for Shakhawan Abdullah and requested that other blocs vote for the KDP candidate. Some MPs departed the session as the clock passed 11 pm in Baghdad. The second round began without the KDP in attendance, but they eventually returned to vote.

At nearly half past midnight, voting in the second round concluded, and the count began. A total of 280 votes were cast, and despite intense lobbying for Shakhawan Abdullah, he received only 102, fewer than in the first round. Rebwar Karim received 157 votes, again just short of victory. A third round was needed, but as the clock approached 1 am, the session was delayed until 2 pm.

The KDP may withdraw rather than face defeat, and they will be furious that the Sunni and Shia parties did not vote through their candidate, violating prior agreements on voting for the candidate of the largest bloc/party for each position. Should it fail to secure the second deputy Speaker role, there will be significant repercussions for the vote on the President of the Republic and the government formation process.

Encouraged by Turkey and by the lessons of the 2021 elections and government-formation attempts, the Sunni parties decided last month to form the National Political Council. This was an attempt to replicate the Shia Coordination Framework model to unite Sunni parties on key issues. The Council’s members included Taqadum, Azm, Siyada, Hasm, and al-Jamahir al-Wataniya, which together made up the vast majority of Sunni seats in Parliament. After several meetings over the past few weeks, the first test for this new council was agreeing on a single candidate for the position of Speaker.

Fragmentation has been a consistent trend in Iraqi politics since 2006. But Sunni parties have been more acutely affected by the lack of consensus and cohesion than the Shia and Kurdish ones. The Speaker position has been hotly contested since 2018, and given the power Muhammad al-Halbusi accumulated during his terms, it is now seen as even more critical to win the post. 

The Federal Supreme Court ratified the election results and deemed December 29 as the final day by which the new Parliament had to hold its first session. Chair of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan made pointed remarks that the first session must conclude with the election of a new Speaker. Pressure was building on the National Political Council to reach a consensus. 

The Council meeting held earlier today was meant to be decisive, but in fact highlighted that major divisions remained. The Council agreed to nominate Haibat al-Halbusi from Taqadum as Speaker. This was announced in a press conference, with Azm leader Muthanna al-Samarrai noticeably absent. Shortly after, Azm held a separate press conference where they announced their intention to nominate their leader, Samarrai, as Speaker.

To most political observers, the split was no surprise. That the majority of the Council parties were able to agree on a candidate can be seen as a success. Taqadum and its affiliates hold more than half of the Sunni seats in Parliament, and they would have the decisive say on the matter. The issue was whether Muhammad al-Halbusi would allow a rival from within Taqadum to emerge by becoming Speaker or if he could negotiate more ministries for Taqadum in exchange for giving up the Speakership. 

Muhammad Tamim, the Planning Minister and a senior Taqadum member, was the preferred candidate by most parties, but Halbusi would not risk such a high-profile figure emerging ahead of him. The other Council parties could not agree on an alternative candidate, though Azm had always insisted Samarrai was their choice. Azm would not give up their ministries for the post, and in the end, Taqadum could not agree on an exchange. 

Halbusi decided that if the Speakership would remain with Taqadum, he needed somebody who would remain a subordinate and not rival him. This led him to choose a tribal relative, Haibat al-Halbusi, the former chair of the Oil and Gas committee in Parliament, as his nominee for Speaker. The clip above from the Council press conference today, with Muhammad telling Haibat essentially not to speak, shows exactly the relationship between the two.

The Council, with the exception of Azm, agreed on the choice, and it will go to a vote tomorrow with at least 2 Sunni candidates. Taqadum expects the Coordination Framework to respect the Council’s choice and vote for its nominee, given that most Sunni parties agree on a candidate, and this is the principle the Framework is keen to preserve. Azm expects the Framework to vote for their nominee, given that it is a long-standing ally and backed the Framework during the 2021-2022 government formation stalemate. The Framework may decide to allow its MPs a free vote to avoid choosing sides. 

It is rumoured that both Haibat al-Halbusi and Muthanna al-Samarrai face pending judicial investigations into corruption and arrest warrants. It would be impossible for Taqadum or Azm to nominate either if they did not have some reassurance from Zaidan that the judiciary would not suddenly intervene. It remains to be seen whether either of them would become Speaker and serve a full term.

The National Political Council failed its first test, and tomorrow’s vote could be a fatal blow to its future coherence. Some compromise, brokered by the Framework, could still emerge, even as the vote takes place, and this is the strongest possibility. Despite the split in Sunni politics, it doesn’t feel that serious. This might be because the divisions within the Kurdish and Shia parties over choosing the President and Prime Minister are even more protracted than those over the Speaker.